

Background of the Reforms (1)

11th March, 2011

TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS Accident

Problems

- Inadequate regulations to prevent-severe accidents
- Lack of preparedness (ex. role-sharing, evacuation plans, materials and equipment)
- Confusion about the decision-making and command chains
- Supports for victims had to expand to cover a wide area, became long-term-
etc.

19th September, 2012

Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)


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Reforms in Japan's-Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response

Background of the Reforms (2)

- It was not clear where the primary responsibility lies in ensuring citizen's safety in an emergency.
- Also, we cannot deny that the existing organizations and structures hindered the mobilization of capabilities in promptly responding to such a large-scale nuclear accident.

Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety (June 2011)




- Thorough separation of regulatory and facilitation functions
- Integration of regulatory functions
- Strengthening of crisis management


Reform of Nuclear Regulatory Organizations

- **Independence:** Separation of regulatory and facilitation functions and establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA), as an independent commission affiliated with the MOE. The Chairman and Commissioners are appointed by the Prime Minister after the approval of the National Diet.
- **Integration:** Integration of regulatory functions, namely, nuclear safety, security, safeguards, radiation monitoring and radioisotopes regulation, into the NRA.

Former Organisations



New Organisation



Structure and Functions of the NRA (1)

- Independence of the NRA -

- Establishment of the NRA as an independent commission.
- Separation of regulatory and facilitation functions.
 - Separation of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
- Prohibition against the transfer of NRA personnel to administrative organisations that facilitate the use of nuclear power (the “no-return-rule”).
 - This will be completely prohibited within five years of the NRA’s formation.
- Independently established regulations for nuclear safety regulation standards.
- Entitlement of the NRA to make recommendations to the relevant Ministers for ensuring nuclear safety.

Structure and Functions of the NRA (2)

~ Integration of Regulatory Functions ~

- (1) Nuclear Safety Regulations (from METI, MEXT and MLIT)
 - (2) Nuclear Security (from METI, MEXT and AEC)
 - (3) Nuclear Safeguards (from MEXT)
 - (4) Radiation Monitoring (from MEXT)
 - (5) Radioisotope Regulations (from MEXT)
- Integration of the functions of the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC)
 - Disbandment of the NSC
 - Discontinuation of the “double-checking system”-
 - Integration of the NSC’s necessary functions into the NRA (with the NRA deciding the necessary guidelines and standards for nuclear safety regulation)

Structure and Functions of the NRA (3)

- Ensuring Transparency —

- Formulation of a framework for public disclosure in absence of a formal request
 - To the extent that this does not fall under the purview of non-disclosure information (private or confidential information) as defined in the Access to Information Act, the NRA uses its website to voluntarily make public as many administrative documents as it can in connection with nuclear regulations, without waiting for formal requests for information disclosure.

- Thorough publication of discussions
 - However informal a meeting may be, as a general principle, the NRA makes the contents of its meetings available to the public, as well as recording discussions between itself and the regulated parties that take place leading up to policy decisions, and make these records available to the public.

- Concrete guidelines for transparency were established by the Commission of the NRA after its creation.

- Streamlining of payment systems and provision of satisfying treatment, in consideration of qualifications or licenses
- Proactive employment of experts with specialized knowledge or experience, from domestic universities, research institutes and private entities
- Employment of experts with specialized knowledge or experience, from foreign universities, research institutes and private entities, in positions where they can express their opinions about Japan's nuclear power administration as third parties (NRA international advisers)
- Human resource exchange among domestic and foreign universities and research institutes; dispatch of Japan's human resources to international organizations and foreign governmental organizations; ensuring of opportunities for human resources to serve in diplomatic establishments or government offices overseas
- Establishment of training facilities and streamlining of training systems to enhance job performance skills (Project for establishing an international nuclear safety training organization)

Enhancement of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

- As a precaution against emergencies, a new Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission (NEPC) has been permanently established under the Cabinet to promote nuclear emergency preparedness measures throughout the government during normal times.
- The NRA instructs and supervises the relevant nuclear operator in resolving the accidents in the event of an emergency at a nuclear facility.



Normal times



Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission
(Permanent establishment under the Cabinet)
 Chairman : Prime Minister
 Vice-Chairman : Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of the Environment, NRA Chairman, etc.
 Secretary General : Minister of the Environment

- Promotion of policy enforcement, etc. based on the Nuclear Emergency Response Guideline
- Promotion of long-term comprehensive policy enforcement in the event of a nuclear accident.

Emergency

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
(Provisional establishment under the Cabinet Office upon the Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency)
 Director-General : Prime Minister
 Deputy Director-Generals : Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister of the Environment, NRA Chairman, etc.

- General Coordination of Nuclear Emergency Response Measures for the Nuclear State of Emergency
- General Coordination of Measures for Restoration from Nuclear Emergency



NRA

- Safety regulation of nuclear facilities
- Formulation of the Nuclear Emergency Response Guideline

Relevant ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of the Environment.
 Implementation of policies promoted by the NEPC, from each administrative perspective

NRA

- Direction of and jurisdiction over the nuclear operators in the resolution of the accident at its nuclear facility

Relevant ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of the Environment.
 Cooperation in the general coordination of the NERH from each administrative perspective

Lessons from Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident (1)

1. Confusion about information sharing and decision making

- The information provided to the Prime Minister's Office was insufficient, causing problems with immediate decision making.

2. Confusion due to the release of information

- Information was release separately by the Prime Minister's Office and NISA, and this caused confusion.

3. Confusion about command and coordination of local emergency response

- The off-site center failed to function as a facility to contain the accident.
- Information from TEPCO was slow to come.


4. Lack of preparedness for severe accidents

- The specialized unit for severe accidents was inadequate.
- Preparedness exercises and training were insufficient.

5. Insufficient support system for victims of a nuclear disaster

- The affected area expanded.
- The term for restoration was prolonged.

Lessons- from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident (2)



1. Handling confusion about information sharing and decision making


- The NRA Chairman and other expert staff assemble at Prime Minister's Office (PMO) to support the Prime Minister (who is the Chief of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters) following the occurrence of a nuclear accident.
- The NRA's Emergency Response Center (ERC) is responsible for-analyzing the development of the accident, as well as communicating and coordinating with local governments, and it facilitates the decision-making of the PMO.
- The TV conference system connects the information networks of the relevant offices (PMO, ERC, NPP, OFC, head offices of nuclear operators, etc.).

2. Handling confusion due to the release of information


- NRA Commissioners and executives attend press conferences given by the ministries and help with technical explanations.

Reform of Emergency Response (2)

- Information Sharing, Decision Making, and Release of Information-



TV conference system network: Sharing information between onsite and offsite.



3. Handling confusion about command and coordination of local emergency response”


- The bases for on-site response and off-site response were divided.
- In terms of on-site response, the Nuclear Facilities Rapid Response Center for Emergency was established as the base for communication and coordination between the government and the nuclear operator, NRA Commissioners and the Deputy Director-General are dispatched directly to this center to gather information and supervise in an emergency.
- In terms of off-site response, off-site centers’ protective measures against radiation were improved. The Senior Vice-Minister / Parliamentary Secretary of the Environment and the Deputy Director-General are dispatched to command the local emergency response in an emergency.

4. Handling lack of preparedness for severe accidents

- If a nuclear operator cannot deal with an accident by itself, it has the cooperation of organizations relevant to emergency response, such as the police, the Self-Defense Force, firefighters, and the Coast Guard.
- Training drills are implemented to maintain preparedness for complex disasters and severe accidents.
- Nuclear operators are required to maintain “Nuclear Rescue Units” and to carry out training drills to maintain preparedness for a severe accident.

Reform of Emergency Response (4)

- Local Emergency Response -



5. Handling of the insufficient support system for victims of a nuclear disaster


- Establishment of a specialized team to support victims of nuclear disasters.
- Enlargement of emergency planning zones and development of expansive evacuation plans for wide areas of strategic preparedness.

For example:

- Development of prompt evacuation plans in the PAZ (approx. 5 km from a nuclear power station)
- Development of expansive evacuation plans including the surrounding prefectures in the UPZ (approx. 30 km from a nuclear power station)

- Establishment of a system for health consultation-/ surveys and preparation of the necessary measures for decontamination and radioactive waste disposal as long-term measures for after an accident.

Framework to Support Victims of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station




Visual representation of a PAZ and a UPZ

PAZ (Precautionary Action Zone): an approximately 5 km radius around a nuclear power station

In this zone, residents take swift actions (e.g., evacuation, intake of iodine tablets) based on the emergency action level (EAL) before the potential release of radioactive material into the environment due to a nuclear accident.

UPZ (Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone): an approximately 5 km to 30 km radius around a nuclear power station

In this zone, residents take actions (e.g., evacuation, temporary relocation, sheltering, intake of iodine tablets) based on the EAL and the operational intervention level (OIL) based on environmental monitoring- data.



Thank you for your attention